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REPLY BRIEF ON MAIN APPEAL
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Despite the length of Brown's rambling Response Brief, the
issues at the heart of this appeal are simple and straightforward.
In Brown I, this Court concluded that Richards had prevailed on
virtually every major issue raised on appeal and was entitled to
attorneys fees as the prevailing party. This Court determined that
the 70% attorneys fees awarded to Richards were not supported by
adequate findings and it remanded the case to the trial judge for
the purpose of making and entering the supporting findings.

On

remand, the court directed the parties "to make their respective
evidentiary

showings of reasonable

fees as outlined

in this

opinion." Browr I, 840 P. 2d at 157.
After a significant expenditure of time and funds, Richards
submitted

voluminous

allocated

attorneys

evidence
fees

and

between

compensable claims for relief.

summary
fee

documentation

compensable

and

See Addendum I of this Brief.

of
nonThe

parties then participated in over 5 days of evidentiary hearings.
It is now clear that Brown never submitted any affirmative evidence
which challenged Richards1 fee allocation.

Thus, when the trial

judge took the matter under advisement in February 1995, the only
detailed and specific allocation of attorneys fees was the evidence
of Richards.
Almost 2 years later, Judge Rigtrup broke the court's silence
and, upon retirement, issued a December 31, 1996 Minute Entry
purporting to award and allocate attorneys fees to Richards.
1

Instead

of

pursuing

this

Court's

directions

on

remand

and

assimilating the evidence and expert testimony adduced by Richards
in the evidentiary hearings, the trial judge simply made up a
multiplier of 35% of the fees requested by Richards, an unsupported
multiplier which was just one-half of the earlier, unsupported
multiplier applied by the trial court in Brown I f 840 P.2d.

This

"gut feeling" approach was as inadequate and legally unsupported as
it was in the earlier approach which resulted in remand.
As demonstrated by Brown's Response Brief, the trial judge
eliminated from the fee award to Richards all evidence relating to
the proof

of Brown's

fraud, even though this Court

expressly

recognized that such evidence was part of Richards' successful
failure

of

substantial

Interwest contract claim.
trial

judge

eliminated

performance

defense

against

Brown's

Further, it is equally clear that the
fees

relating

to

substantial

evidence

proving Richards' affirmative breach of warranty claim because of
the commonality of facts with Richards' fraud evidence.

The latter

was both a defense to Brown's Interwest contact claim and the
affirmative
erred.

fraud counterclaim.

In doing so, the trial

judge

Brown's Response Brief only serves to underscore that

error.
The trial court has had two opportunities to prepare adequate
findings

on

attorneys

fees and has

initially in Brown I, 840 P.2d.

failed

here

as

it

failed

This Court should remand this case

with directions for the trial court to modify its prior judgment
and enter expedited findings based upon the evidentiary record
2

already made.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE UNDERLYING PREMISES OF BROWN'S ARGUMENTS ARE FLAWED. IT
IS NOW CLEAR THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE FUNDAMENTALLY ERRED IN
ESTIMATING THE AWARD OF RICHARDS' ATTORNEYS FEES.
Brown's arguments, presented both in response to Richards1

appeal and in support of Brown's appeal, arise primarily from the
following three erroneous premises:
1.

Richards

failed

to

allocate

attorneys

fees

between

recoverable and non-recoverable claims, as required by
this Court;
2.

Richards is not entitled to an award of attorneys fees
for

prevailing

on

his

fraud

and

other

substantial

performance defense of Brown's Interwest contract claims,
but

is

limited

only

to

fees

for

prevailing

on

his

affirmative breach of warranty claim; and
3.

Richards' evidentiary proof of his breach of warranty
claim

was

separate

and

distinct

from

proof

of

his

contract defense and affirmative fraud claim.
All three arguments are flawed, and Brown's positions, both on
appeal and cross-appeal, must be rejected.
A.

Richards Properly Allocated His Attorneys Fees Between
Fee Compensable and Non-Compensable Claims,

Brown makes the astonishing argument that on remand, Richards
failed to allocate his attorneys fees between fee compensable and
non-compensable claims as directed by this Court. Brown Ir 840 P. 2d
at

157. He

further

alleges

that
3

counsel's

billing

practices

rendered it impossible to allocate time properly.

Based upon this

alleged "failure to allocate," Brown asks this Court to reverse
Richardsf

award

altogether.

of attorneys

fees and to deny Richards' fees

These arguments are without merit to the point of

being frivolous.
1.

Richards1 Counsel Kept Detailed and Adequate Time
Records.

Brown first asserts that Richards1 counsel kept poor time
records because they failed to assign every task performed to a
particular claim.

Had Richards done so, Brown argues, allocation

would have been simple, a "mathematical function" requiring minimal
allocation.

Brown Br. at 23.

As a threshold observation, there is absolutely no precedent
requiring that a lawyer undertake Brown's onerous and unrealistic
billing practice.

Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court

has ever suggested that attorneys must record their time so that
each task and effort performed must be mechanically assigned at the
time to a specific claim in a multiple claim or complex case.
Instead, the sole requirement for the recovery of attorneys fees is
that the particular and total time incurred be reasonably allocated
between fee compensable and non-compensable claims.
Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 830 P.2d

266

See e.g. f

(Utah 1992); Selvage v.

Johnson, 910 P.2d 1252 (Utah App. 1996); Brown I at 143.

Even the

trial court below found that Brown's theoretical billing standard
was unrealistic and impossible:
Defendants' counsel did not allocate time
based on individual claims because of the
impracticality of doing so.
It would be
4

difficult if not impossible in many instances
to know how efforts made might relate to one
claim or another.
See, Appellant's Addendum "C" at p. 3 J 3.
Brown also argues that Richards inappropriately engaged in
"block billing."1 Brown's argument entirely ignores the fact that
for much of the relevant period, Richards' counsel had underlying
base records of the amount of

time spent on each task.

In

addition, Brown presents no evidence that daily totals for time
billing was an inappropriate method of time keeping in 1985-1989.
By contrast, Richards provided unrefuted testimony from Harold G.
Christiansen and Richards' counsel, Mr. Campbell, that Richards'
billing method was not only an accepted but an appropriate billing
practice in complex commercial litigation in the late 1980's.
2.

Richards Did Make The Allocations Required By This
Court.

Brown further argues that Richards failed completely on remand
to make the

fee allocation as directed

by this Court.

This

assertion is frivolous and even sanctionable. Utah R. App. P. 33.
Richards

submitted

allocation.2

a

highly

detailed

and

very

specific

fee

See R. 5117-56 and Supp. Add.

*The phrase "block billing" refers to the general practice of
recording a number of specific tasks performed during the day but
applying listing only a daily total for time spent.
2

In direct contradiction of his assertion that Richards failed to
allocate Brown offers selective examples of alleged misallocation.
Brown Br. At 16-17.
To begin with, Brown challenges Richards'
inclusion of time spend preparing and deposing John Sharp. Sharp
testified about Interwest's reputation and testified that Boyd
Brown told charter pilots to disconnect the Hobbs meter, a devise
which records the amount of time flown by an aircraft. The time
recorded on the Hobbs meter determines when certain FAA required
5

Richards' Amended Judgment Memorandum separated his total fees
and costs into fourteen categories, and then allocated the fees or
costs

in

each

category

between

the

fee

compensable

claims

(Richards1 successful contract defense and the breach of warranty
claim) and

the non-compensable claims.

Supp. Add. The actual

invoices were also provided to the trial court.

Id.

This offered

evidence plainly demonstrates that Richards appropriately allocated
fees.3
B.

Contrary To Brown7s Misguided Argument, Richards Is
Entitled To Fees Incurred Not Only On His Breach Of
Warranty Claim But Also On His Successful Defense To
Brown's Contract Claims,

This Court held clearly in Brown I f

840 P. 2d at 150, that

Richards relied on the "fraud defense" as part of the "substantial
performance

"defense"

in

prevailing

against

Brown's

Interwest

maintenance must be performed. This testimony was relevant to the
specific warranties that there were no undisclosed contingent
liabilities and that the seller had observed and performed all of
its obligations, as the conduct alleged was criminal. It also was
relevant to the general warranty that no misrepresentations were
made that Interwest had the best reputation of all the FBO's at the
airport.
The reputation testimony was relevant to Richards1
substantial performance defense as one of the assets purchased by
Richards was the goodwill.
Brown also selectively complained that Richards improperly
included in its fee request the time of Robert Campbell, Elizabeth
Dunning and Franklin Smith for a two hour meeting, and two specific
time entries of Elizabeth Dunning and Carolyn Cox.
Richards
included such time in his fee request because such conferences
addressed the common factual basis of both fee compensable and noncompensable claims.
3

Richards Amended Judgment Memorandum and accompanying affidavits
set forth in a systematic manner the allocations made by Richards
and the supporting reasons. See, Supp. Add. A.
6

contract claim.
proving

his

Accordingly, Richards was entitled to his fees for

fraud

defense.

Brown

If

840 P. 2d

at

150, 154.

Notwithstanding this Court's express ruling which is now the law of
the case, Brown now argues that Richards is only entitled to fees
in connection with his affirmative breach of warranty claim. Brown
Br. at 38-40.

In doing so, Brown contends that Richards is not

entitled to fees incident to his substantial performance defense of
Brown's Interwest contract claim, because Richards did not raise a
substantial performance defense in his original pleadings.
Not

only

was

Richards

substantial

performance

defense,

including Brown's fraud, raised and incorporated in the pre-trial
order

(R. 5680) , the defense was expressly tried to the

jury

without objection, was submitted to the jury under a substantial
performance
verdict

instruction,

form

submitted

and
to

was

the

incorporated

the

jury, viz., whether

substantially performed the Interwest contract.
not only

in

special

Brown

R. 2808-09.

failed to object to the jury instruction

had

Brown

or special

verdict form, he failed to raise the issue on appeal to this Court
in Brown I.

Brown cannot now claim in a subsequent second appeal,

that Richards' substantial performance defense, including the fraud
defense, was tried improperly and that Richards is not entitled to
his attorneys fees for prevailing on that defense.
E.D. C.D.r

C D . & W.D. v. E.J.P.. 876 P.2d 397, 402

State in re
(Utah App.

1994) (Failure to make objections at trial waives right to raise
issue on appeal); Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n., 945 P.2d 125,
13 6 (Utah App. 1997)(same).
7

C.

Contrary to Brown's Brief. Richards Is Entitled To His
Fees Incurred On His Breach Of Warranty Claim,

Brown argues that the trial judge correctly reduced Richards1
fees

incurred

counterclaim

in

connection

because

the

with

evidence

counterclaim and the fraud claim.
dispute

that

this

complex

the

breach

"overlapped"

On the one

commercial

of

warranty

between

the

hand, there is no

litigation

involved

significant overlap between the common factual bases of the various
claims.

Indeed, virtually all the evidence Richards presented

regarding Brown's misrepresentations, omissions and fraud and the
difference between the quality and value of the assets promised and
those actually delivered went not only to Richards1

substantial

performance defense of the Interwest asset contract, but also to
Richards1 affirmative breach of warranty counterclaim.
On the other hand, there is no authority or law for the
proposition that an evidentiary overlap between fee compensable and
non-compensable claims means that fees connected to the overlap are
non-compensable.
at 28-32.

The law is quite to the contrary. See Br. of App.

Brown offers up selected examples of witnesses whose

testimony allegedly went only to the fraud claim and not to the
breach of warranty claim.4

Brown Br. at 42 n. 9.

4

Where Brown

Brownfs argument as to the testimony of Steve Featherstone misses
the mark. Featherstone's evidence went primarily to the value and
condition of the contract assets and business, which testimony was
relevant both to the substantial performance defense of the
contract
claim
and the breach
of warranty
counterclaim.
Accordingly, no attorney time in connection with that evidence was
eliminated. Lawyer time as to the evidence of Boyd Brown and Don
Wittke was eliminated, in part, because 30% thereof was expended on
building contract issues rather than the asset contract.
8

notes that a number of witnesses testified on the Hobbs meter and
Interwest's reputation, such testimony was relevant not only to
Richards1

affirmative

fraud

claim,

but

also

to

Richards1

affirmative breach of warranty claim and Richards1 fraud defense to
Brown's Interwest's contract claim.
Where there were instances in which the testimony related
solely to the affirmative fraud claim, the attorneys fees relating
to that evidence were eliminated from Richards' fee request. Supp.
Add. p.

17-19.

In addition, the time spent on evidence associated

with Richards' other successful tort claim, such as Lee Brown's
testimony, was eliminated

as it went to a claim

attorney's fees were not recoverable.

for which

R. 4745.

Brown's theory appears to be that Richards' fraud evidence was
distinct from his beach of warranty evidence because breach of
warranty does not require proof of Brown's knowledge or motives,
while fraud does.

The answer to that argument, however, is that

Richards' breach of warranty claim arose in part from Brown's
warranty that he had made no misrepresentations or omissions in
connection with the sale of the Interwest business. Thus, evidence
regarding Brown's knowledge or motives was clearly relevant to that
particular warranty.
In a futile effort, Brown somehow argues that the commonality
of facts underpinning the successful fraud and lack of substantial
performance

defense

to Brown's

Interwest

contract

claim

and

Richards' breach of warranty counterclaim must be rejected because
"the jury found benefit of the bargain damages, even though
9

available, were not appropriate for breach of warranty claims."
Brown Br. at 42.

But the special verdict form cited by Brown does

not indicate (nor was it required to) the jury's rationale behind
its breach of warranty award.
required

the

jury

to

The format of the special verdict

decide

Richards'

fraud

and

negligent

misrepresentation counterclaims and award damages thereon before it
reached the breach of warranty counterclaim.
was

instructed

damages.

that Richards was not

Moreover, the jury

entitled

to

duplicative

Thus, it is to be presumed that the fact the jury awarded

Richards less on his breach of warranty counterclaim than on his
fraud

counterclaim

does

not

suggest

that

the

jury

rejected

Richards' right to benefit of the bargain damages, but only that it
was following the trial court's instructions to avoid duplicative
damages.
Brown's

flawed

argument

on the

commonality

of

the

facts

between Richards' successful breach of warranty claims and the
equally
defense

successful
claims

inconsistency.

fraud

and

founders

in

lack
a

of
mass

substantial
of

performance

contradiction

and

Richards made significant reductions for time spent

on evidence that went to issues for which attorneys fees are not
recoverable.
not

required

Under the unquestioned law of the case, Richards was
to

eliminate

lawyer

time

simply

because

it

was

relevant to both fee compensable and non-compensable claims.
II.

CONTRARY TO BROWN'S CONTENTION, RICHARDS, IN APPEALING THE
DISTRICT JUDGE'S AWARD OF FEES THROUGH TRIAL, APPLIED THE
CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE.
Brown contends that Richards' appeal of the trial judge's
10

award of fees through the initial trial must be rejected because
(1) Richards failed to apply an abuse of discretion standard and
(2) Richards failed to marshal the evidence.
wrong

standard

of

review

and

has

Brown argues the

categorically

failed

to

demonstrate that Richards did not marshal the evidence in support
of the trial judge's inadequate findings.
A.

Richards Has Applied
Standard Of Review.

The Proper

Correction

of

Error

At the outset, Brown acknowledges that the standard of review
regarding entitlement to attorneys fees is correction of error.
Brown Br. at 35. Richards first challenges the trial judge's award
of fees for work through trial on the essential premise that Judge
Rigtrup erred in failing to award Richards fees for his successful
defenses, including fraud, to Brown's Interwest asset contract
claim.

That is a correction of error standard.

Carlie v. Morgan,

922 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1996).
Secondly,
findings

and

Richards
award

of

further

challenges

attorneys

prejudicial error was committed

fees

on

the
the

trial

judge's

premise

that

in awarding only a portion of

Richards' fees incurred in connection with the affirmative breach
of warranty claim because of a factual overlap with the fraud
claim.

This issue is also governed by a correction of error

standard because it raises Richards' entitlement to attorneys fees
where fee compensable and non-compensable claims share a common
factual and therefore evidentiary basis.

Selvage v. J.J. Johnson

and Assoc.. 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah App. 1996).

11

Finally, Richards challenges the trial judge's fee award to
Richards because the findings and conclusions are insufficient and
do not support the trial judge's award.

Brown acknowledges that

correction of error is the proper standard of review.
B.

Richards Did Not Fail To Marshal The Evidence In This
Appeal.

As an initial matter, the complete absence of factual findings
by the trial judge and the absence of supporting evidence in the
record is such that there is no evidence in support of the trial
court judgment for Richards to marshal.
Notwithstanding that fact, Brown produced only two witnesses
on the issue of attorneys fees, namely, George Naegle and Bruce
Coke.
Even

Naegle had experience only as an insurance defense lawyer.
at that, Naegle's

testimony

did

not

challenge Richards'

allocation of fees between fee compensable and
claims.

non-compensable

Naegle's testimony concerned block billing requirements of

insurance companies and was irrelevant to fees awarded in complex
commercial litigation before the trial court.
The testimony of Bruce Coke did not begin to support the trial
court's conclusion that approximately 35% of the total time through
trial

should

be

allocated

to

Richards'

breach

of

warranty

counterclaim.
One piece of evidence upon which Judge Rigtrup did rely upon
in his final December 31, 1996 Minute Entry was the evidence of
David Thompson, an Assistant Attorney General
Appeals Division.

in the

Criminal

Judge Rigtrup refused to allow Thompson to

12

testify on the issue of attorneys fees for lack of experience and
qualification.

Inexplicablyr the trial judge then relied in his

findings upon the Thompson testimony that he had excluded from
evidence.
C.

Add. C at 5, f 14.
Brown Effectively Concedes That The Trial Court's
Findings On Attorneys Fees Were As Inadequate As The
Initial Findings Which Were Set Aside By this Court In
Brown I,

Brown attempts to defend the adequacy of the trial judge's
Findings in support of its fee award by comparing them to the
findings in Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996).
However, Salmon involved two day-long, single count misdemeanor
trials where the only challenge to the fee request was that the
total amount of fees was excessive.

The findings adequate to

support the fee award in Salmon are not comparable to the type of
findings necessary to support an award of fees in a complex civil
case.
A recent case from this Court, Selvage, 910 P. 2d 1252,
demonstrates the inadequacy of the Findings by the trial judge
herein.

In Selvager the plaintiff prevailed on contract claims,

for which fees were available, and on non-contract claims for which
they were not.
fees.

Plaintiff sought to recover all of its attorneys

Defendant

did

not

challenge

plaintiff's

evidence of

attorneys fees or provide affirmative evidence of what a reasonable
fee would be for the contract claims but instead argued that
plaintiff was only entitled to fees for the contract claims and
should be denied all fees for the failure to allocate between the
13

compensable and non-compensable claims.
Without making any supportive findings, the trial court in
Selvage awarded approximately 40% of the amount requested.

This

Court reversed for insufficient findings stating:
[C]onclusory statements do not satisfy the
requirement that awards of attorneys fees must
be supported by adequate findings of fact. . .
.The need for sufficiently detailed findings
is especially great where, as here, the
reasonableness of the fee and the supporting
affidavit were uncontroverted by the opposing
party. . . .In shortr when reducing an
uncontroverted fee, "it is necessary that the
trial court, on the record, identify such
factors [the factors leading to the reduction]
and otherwise explain the basis for its sua
sponte reduction.. . .Vague statements which
require speculation as to the actual reasons
behind the ruling are not enough to meet this
burden.
Id. at 1265 and n.12. (Emphasis added).

This Court also rejected

defendant's argument that the sufficient findings in support of the
award could be implied.

Id. at 1266 (to imply findings there must

be clear evidence that the court actually considered and made the
findings).
Here, the trial judge failed to address most of the factors
which this Court instructed it to consider on remand, and made no
findings whatsoever as to how the factors it considered affected
the amount awarded.

Further, the trial court's findings regarding

the necessity of the work and the reasonableness of the rates—
i.e., that the time expended by Richards' attorneys and the
services rendered were reasonable, and that the rates charged were
reasonable—support Richards' request for fees, not the amount
awarded by the trial judge.

Addendum C, at 2, ff 1, 2.

The trial court did not address the difficulty of the work,
but instead simply concluded that Richards allocated more time to
pursuit of the breach of warranty claim than is reasonable and fair
and that "3 5% of the total time expended through trial" would be
more reasonable.
The methodology supporting the 35% multiplier is entirely left
to the guesswork of the parties and this Court.

The 3 5% percent

found

than the

compensable

on remand

is less supported

court's initial award of 70% of the total time.

trial

In making the

initial award, the trial court compared the amount of time expended
on the asset sale issues to the amount of time spent on the
building sale issues in arriving at the compensable percentage of
time.

On remandr the findings are silent as to how the trial court

reached the 3 5% figure.
because

it

is

The trial court's award must be reversed

completely

unsupported

by

the

Findings

and

Conclusions.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RICHARDS ONLY 60% OF HIS
APPELLATE FEES.
Brown argues the trial court's award of 60% of Richards' fees
was

appropriate

incurred

among

because:

1) Richards

compensable,

failed

non-compensable

to
and

allocate

fees

unsuccessful

claims; 2) Brown prevailed on many claims; and 3) the main theme of
Richards'

case was

fraud.

In making

these

arguments,

Brown

ignores, as did the trial court, this Court's clear holding that
Richards was the prevailing party on appeal, with the exception of
one minor issue.

Brown If 840 P.2d at 156.
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Consistent with this Court's direction in Brown I f Richards
omitted from his appellate fee request the time directly allocable
to the one page of his response/reply brief which was devoted to
the one issue on which Brown prevailed.

R. 4544-45.

The remaining

fees related to compensable issues, and the trial court did not
find that the amount of time spent on the appeal was unreasonable.
In the absence of such a finding, the trial court had no choice but
to follow this Court's direction and award Richards fees for the
time expended, except on one minor issue on which Brown prevailed.
IV.

RICHARDS WAS ENTITLED TO PEES FOR PROVING FEES.
In arguing that Richards was not entitled to an award of fees

incurred in proving his fees, Brown spends a significant part of
his Brief attempting to distinguish this case from Salmon v. Davis
County, on which the trial court relied in making its award.

As

importantly, however, Brown completely ignores James Constructors,
Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1994), a
decision which is directly on point and provides such fees are
recoverable.
In James Constructors r

this Court held

that a party

was

"entitled to recover the attorney fees it incurred establishing the
reasonableness
indemnified."
that

this

of

the

fees

for

which

it

Id. at 674 (emphasis added) .

result

was

required

under

is

entitled

to

be

This Court made clear

ordinary

contract

law

principles and did not arise from specific indemnity law doctrines.
Moreover, Salmon also supports the trial court's award of fees
for proving fees.

The underlying rationale of Salmon is that a
16

statutory attorneys fee provision is eviscerated if the party
cannot recover the fees incurred in proving fees.

That rationale

applies equally to a contractual attorneys fee provision.
In addition, here, as in Salmon, it was Brownf s conduct on
remand which increased the cost of determining fees.

Richards was

prepared to submit the matter to the trial court on the basis of
the detailed billings and pleadings.

However, Brown requested an

evidentiary hearing and then insisted on continuing the examination
by deposition.

Brown insisted on a second evidentiary hearing

which lasted four full days.

At least $25,000.00 of the fees

requested for proving fees were incurred in connection with the
deposition and evidentiary hearings. R. 5281-82, 5384, 5403, 6049
at 62. It is hypocrisy for Brown to argue that it was Richards who
caused the expenditure of significant sums in establishing the
reasonableness of fees.5
Finally, Brown argues Richards should not receive fees for
proving fees because this Court's remand for calculation of fees in
Brown I was necessitated by Richards1 failure to allocate fees
prior to the first appeal. This is absolute nonsense. In Brown If
this Court remanded Richards1 fee award because of the trial
court's failure to enter adequate findings and not based upon any

5

Brown also asserts, without citation to the record, that Richards
spent the entire $79,000 sought for proving fees in attempting to
allocate between compensable and non-compensable fees. In addition
to including the fees incurred in evidentiary hearings, the amount
requested by Richards also includes time spent litigating all of
the amended judgment and fee issues, including recalculating the
judgment as instructed by this Court, and responding to the variety
of motions filed by Brown.
17

inadequacy

in

Richards1

proof

of

the

reasonableness

or

compensability of fees. Brown 1, 840 P. 2d at 156. Richards is
entitled to recover attorneys fees for the cost of proving his
fees.
V.

BROWN IS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE RECOVERABLE COSTS AND EXPENSES
REDEFINED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE ON REMAND AFTER THOSE EXPENSES
HAVE ALREADY BEEN DEFINED AND THE LAW OF THE CASE SETTLED BY
HIS STIPULATION AND CONSENT IN BROWN I.
Brown argues that the trial court's new interpretation of the

term "costs" in the relevant attorneys fees provision to include
only those costs allowed by Utah R. Civ. P. 54 should be upheld
because the trial court simply took the opportunity to "correct" its
earlier "erroneous" ruling.

Brown misses the point.

The trial

court is precluded from reconsidering and "correcting" its earlier
ruling by the law of the case doctrine and by estoppel.

Opening

Br. at 44-45 and n. 11.
CONCLUSION6

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

RESPONSE BRIEF ON BROWN'S CROSS-APPEAL
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Many of the issues raised in Brown's Cross-Appeal, such as the
alleged failure to allocate fees properly, or the argument that
Richards is not entitled to recover fees incurred in proving fees,

6

See end of Brief, p. 24.
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have already been fully addressed in the foregoing section of this
Reply Brief.

Therefore, to avoid unnecessary repetition, this

section will only discuss issues that are unique to the CrossAppeal.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON
RICHARDS' ATTORNEYS FEES AWARD.
Richards

did

not

seek,

nor

interest on his attorneys fees.
awarded

post-judgment

was

he

awarded,

prejudgment

Rather he sought and was properly

interest

at

the

contract

rate

on

his

attorneys fees from and after October 18, 1990, the date of the
first Final Judgment.

The award of post-judgment interest was

mandated by this Court's decision in Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan
Corp., 754 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1988), and the earlier case, Hewitt
v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 5 Utah 2d 379, 302 P.2d 712 (Utah
1956) .
In Mason, this Court held that when a judgment is modified
either upward or downward on appeal, it nonetheless bears interest
from the date of entry of the original judgment.
986.

In Hewitt, judgment was entered

Mason, 754 P.2d

for plaintiff upon the

verdict and then set aside by the trial court.

On appeal, the Utah

Supreme Court reversed and ordered that judgment for plaintiff be
reinstated.

On remand, the trial court allowed interest only from

the date of the reinstated judgment.

The Utah Supreme Court again

reversed and ordered that post-judgment interest should run from
the date of the original judgment.

Hewitt, 302 P.2d 714.

Brown misreads Mason and this Court's later case, Bailey-Allen
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Co. v. Kurzetr 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994), for the proposition
that "in any case remanded to the trial court, judgment interest
dates only from the entry of the new judgment."

Brown Br. at 26.

In point of law, Mason held that where a judgment is reversed on
appeal and entry of judgment is ordered for a different party,
post-judgment interest runs only from the date of entry of the new
judgment.

In Bailey-Allenr

this Court overturned the basis of

Bailey-Allen's judgment because the Court did not apply the correct
law and remanded for a redetermination of liability. This Court
directed that if Bailey-Allen obtained a judgment on a correct
interpretation of the law, interest could only run from the date of
that new judgment.
In Brown I, this Court affirmed the basis of Richards1 award.
The amount was subject to redetermination, upward or downward, but
the

initial

judgment

in

Richards1

favor

remained

Richards was therefore entitled to and properly

in

place.

awarded post-

judgment interest on his fee and cost award from October 18, 1990,
the date when judgment was first entered in his favor.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE POST-JUDGMENT RATE IN
EFFECT ON THE DATE THE INITIAL JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED.
Brown argues that interest on Richards1 breach of fiduciary

duty and punitive damage awards should be calculated at 12% from
October 1990 through May 1993 and thereafter at a different rate
each year pursuant to the May 3, 1993 amendment to the postjudgment interest statute.
The

May

1993

Brown is in error.

amendment

to
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Utah
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Richards1 favcr has been in efiect continually since October 1990
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and there is no basis to change the post-judgment interest rate on
May

Interest on Richards1

3, 1993.

awards must therefore be

calculated at the rate of 12% per year from October 1990.
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PREJUDGMENT
RICHARDS' BREACH OF WARRANTY DAMAGES.

INTEREST

ON

Brown contends that Richards is not entitled to prejudgment
interest on his breach of warranty damages because 1) the warranty
damages

are

not

the

type

for

which

prejudgment

interest

is

available, and 2) the original judgment did not provide for such
interest and Richards did not raise the prejudgment interest issue
on appeal.

Brown's contentions are incorrect.

First, the breach of warranty award is exactly the type of
case in which prejudgment interest is allowable.

Biork v. April

Indus.r Inc.r 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah), cert, denied. 431 U.S. 930
(1977) (pre-judgment interest is appropriate where the damage is
fixed as of a particular time and the loss can be measured by facts
and figures); Vasels v. LoGuidicer 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987)
(same).

Richards1 breach of warranty damages were fixed as of a

particular time—April 24, 1984—the effective date of the Asset
Sale Agreement.

Moreover, the formula by which those damages are

calculated—the difference between the assets as warranted and as
received—demonstrates that his damages were measured by calculated
facts.
Contrary to Brown's arguments, in assessing Richards1 damages,
the jury was instructed to award damages based on a comparison of
the value of the assets as received and as warranted.
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Unless Richards

is awarded prejudgment interest on his breach of warranty awardr
7

Brown cites a number of cases in support of his argument that
prejudgment interest is not appropriate.
None apply here.
In
Bellon v. Malnarr 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991), Bailey-Allen Co.
v.Kurzetr 240 Utah Ad. Rep. 17, 20 (Utah App. 1994), and Shoreline
Dev., Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207,211 (Utah App. 1992), each
court found prejudgment interest was inappropriate because it was
sought on an equitable claim, such as unjust enrichment, and
prejudgment interest is not generally allowed on equitable claims.
Richards' breach of warranty claim sounds in express contract, a
claim for which prejudgment interest has often been awarded.
Shoreline Dev. f 835 P.2d at 211; Bellon, 808 P.2d at 1097.
Finally, in Price-Orem v. Rawlins, Brown & Gunnellr 784 P.2d 465
(Utah App. 1989), this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of
prejudgment interest on an award of lost profits because an award
of lost profits requires a judgment regarding future events.
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Brown will recover 10 years of interest on $100,000 worth of assets
which he never delivered to Richards.

This Court should not permit

such a rapacious result.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ENTERED A JUDGMENT PROPER IN FORM.
Brown

argues

that

despite

trial

court

erroneously refused to enter a net judgment in this case.

Brown

never requested a net judgment.

his

request,

the

The page to which Brown cites

shows only his request that the trial court decide the attorneys
fees issue so that a final judgment can be entered.

Moreover the

Post-Appeal Judgment (Post Reconsideration) entered by the trial
court on March 21, 1998, was prepared by Brown's counsel.

Brown

now cannot claim as error the form of a judgment which he himself
proposed.8
CONCLUSION
Richards has waited a resolution of this case since the return
of the favorable jury verdict in April 1989.
Court's Decision

in Brown I in August

From the time of this

1992, and remand

after

Brown's unsuccessful Certiorari in March 1993, it took the trial
judge nearly 4 years to settle the satellite issue of attorneys
fees and enter a judgment on remand, which has now been the subject
of this second appeal.

8

Bailey Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180 (Utah App. 1997),
cited by Brown, is inapplicable here.
In Bailey-Allen, the
applicable post-judgment interest rate for judgments was the same.
Here, because some of the claims on which Brown prevailed were
brought pursuant to the applicable contracts, while the claims on
which Richards prevailed were both contractual and non-contractual
claims, different interest rates apply.
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Defendants and Counter Plaintiffs David K. Richards and David K. Richards &
Co. (collectively "Richards") by their attorneys submit this Memorandum in support of
their Motion for Entry of Amended Judgment.
BACKGROUND
This matter was tried to a jury for eight weeks beginning on February 28, 1989.
The jury returned, its verdict

.

..*-.-

-.

JI.,C:,C JUUL::::J

issues except attorneys fees and prejudgment interest on December 21, 1989.

1
Final

Judgment, incorporating the Court's rulings on prejudgment interest and attorneys fees,
was enterec

;, uc;. » -:

*•"•

:>^th parties appealed and the Court of Appeals'

decision was rendered on August 24, 1992. After the Petition for Writ of Certiorari of
plaintiffs and counter defendants Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Corporation
("Brown") was denied on March 23, . -.*.. .:ic CU^-L V as remanded to this Court for entry
of a new judgment consistent with the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals requires that the judgment be amended in
five areas:

:uu::ic:.

:.. J -

nards and agaii. •*

:. .*. *

i

MI'S

contract claims under the Interwest Asset Sale and Purchase and Option Agreement
(Asset Sale Agreement); 2) the purchase price of the Interwest assets must be
recalculates

..-.. . . . . . .

•

. .

• .r:...ity claim 11n ist

be amended to provide for Richards' recovery of the damages awarded by the jury; 4)
1

Richards' application for an award of attorneys fees and costs under the Asset Sale
Agreement for proceedings in this Court must be reconsidered and an amount entered
which is supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law; and 5) attorneys fees must
be awarded to Brown for fees incurred, if any, in defending against Richards' efforts to
rescind contracts other than the Asset Sale Agreement where those contracts provide for
such fees. Richards' Motion and this Memorandum address the first four issues.
I. RECALCULATION OF PURCHASE PRICE FOR INTERWEST ASSETS
According to the Court of Appeals, the purchase price for the Interwest assets is
to be calculated by subtracting Richards' jury award of $500,000 on the fraud and
misrepresentation claims from the original purchase price of $900,000 set forth in the
Asset Sale Agreement, applying payments made to the adjusted purchase price of
$400,000, calculating interest and then determining what, if any, amount is still due.
Richards has made this calculation on Exhibit A attached. The dates of payments made
by Richards, the dates from which interest runs, and the application of those payments
between the first and second half of the assets are taken from this Court's Final
Judgment, dated October 16, 1990. As of March 7, 1994, the amount due on the first
half of the assets is $121,177.08 and the amount due on the second half is $345,416.75
including prejudgment and postjudgment interest.

?

II.

RICHARDS IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT AND POSTJUDGMENT
INTEREST ON HIS BREACH OF WARRANTY AWARD
Richards is entitled to prejudgment interest on his breach of warranty award, as

it represents compensation for damages on which prejudgi nent interest is appropriate:
[w]here the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of
a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures,
interest should be allowed from that time and not from the date of the
judgment.
Biork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977) cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930
(1977); see also, Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987).
The damage to Richards as a result oi brown's breach of warranties contained in
the Asset Sale Agreement was fixed as of a particular time; i,e

at the time the

Agreement was entered into as of April 24, 1984. Moreover, Richards' damage can be
measured by facts and figures, Le^ the difference between the assets as warranted and
as received.

See, e.g. Jorgensen * 3 ohti Cla\ and Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah

1983)(prejudgment interest appropriate in breach of contract case). Richards is therefore
entitled to an award of prejudgment interest from c "Vpril 24, 1984, • :)i:i his bi eaci I of
warranty award in the amount of $56,630.14 as shown on Exhibit B attached.
Richards is entitled to postjudgment interest on his breach of warranty award from
December 23, 1989.

.

. .

Richards' favor on that claim. See Hewitt v. General Tire and Rubber Company, 302
3

P.2d 712 (Utah 1956)(party who reinstated verdict and judgment in its favor on appeal
entitled to interest from date of original award). In Hewitt the jury returned a verdict for
plaintiff and the clerk entered judgment on the verdict. Defendant moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court granted. On appeal the Utah Supreme
Court reversed the trial court and reinstated the verdict.

On remand the trial court

refused to award postjudgment interest from the date of the original judgment but instead
awarded it only from the date of the judgment on remand. Plaintiff appealed again and
the Supreme Court ordered that interest run from the date of the original judgment,
reasoning that there was no good reason why plaintiff should lose his interest because
defendant was able to convince the trial court to make an erroneous ruling. Hewitt, 302
P.2d at 714.
Similarly, in this case Richards has had a judgment in his favor on his breach of
warranty claim since December 21, 1989, but that judgment was in effect set aside by
the trial court.

Because Richards' award was reinstated by the Court of Appeals'

decision, Richards is entitled to postjudgment interest from December 21, 1989, the date
the initial judgment was entered, to the present in the amount of $65,987.67 as shown
on Exhibit B attached.
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RICHARDS IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNE\5 httb AND COSIS AS
PREVIOUSLY AWARDED BY THE COURT, AS WELL AS
SUBSEQUENTLY INCURRED FEES AND COSTS
After full briefing by the parties and a hearing on the issue, the Court awarded
Richards $435,000 in attorney s fees ai id costs and awarded Brown $250,000 in fees and
costs. At the time it announced its decision, the Court outlined in general its reasons for
awarding these amounts but did not enter any findings and conclusions. The Court of
Appeals agreed vv ith this Coi 11 t that K ichards is entitled to ai 1 award of fees a v.

-; ,i

the prevailing party on the Asset Sale Agreement. However, the Court of Appeals found
Richards' award was not supported by factual findings sufficient for appellate review and
therefore remanded this issi le foi a i ecalculation of tl le a1 : ./ a i :i and ei ltry of suppoi ting
findings of fact.
The Court of Appeals directed that attorneys fees be awarded according to the
process set fo

:i Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine,

Cottonwood Mall outlines a three part process for determining an appropriate award of
fees. First, the party seeking the award must produce evidence sufficient to support the
award. Sect

. :-v ..

,:•:;.-

-.r; -

-*-\-> ^ fees for work d :>ne

on claims subject to a fee award and work done on claims not subject to a fee award.
Finally, in determining an appropriate amount the court should consider six factors
concerning flir n.itiin cif" ihv litigation ami flu," legal services rendered. Id. at 269-70.
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As demonstrated below, under the Cottonwood Mall analysis, this Court should award
Richards attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $531,491.01 for work performed
through March 1990, with postjudgment interest on that amount from October 18, 1990
to the present in the amount of $179,978.87 and attorneys fees and costs in the amount
of $46,439.07 for work performed from April 1990 to the present.
A.

Richards Has Provided An Appropriate Evidentiary Basis
for an Award of Fees and Costs

Richards submits with this Memorandum the Affidavits of Elizabeth T. Dunning
and Robert S. Campbell, Jr. Attached to those affidavits are copies of all invoices
submitted for representation of Richards from the initiation of the litigation through the
date of this Memorandum.

These invoices show each occasion on which work was

performed in connection with the litigation, the nature of the work performed, the amount
of time (in tenths of hours) spent on each occasion, the attorney or other law firm
employee who performed the work and the hourly rate charged for that employee. At
the end of each invoice the total hours and the total fees for those hours are calculated.
In addition each invoice shows the total costs advanced and a breakdown of those costs.
The invoices give the Court the basis for determining what legal work was actually
performed, as required by Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), and
give Brown the opportunity to contest their accuracy, as required by Cottonwood Mall.
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B.

Richards Has Apportioned Fees As Required

Consistent with the requirement of Cottonwood MalL Richards has apportioned
the fees and costs sought between work

: *: . :

.:. entitlement to fees and

work for which there is no entitlement to fees, either because Richards was unsuccessful
on the claim or because there was no contractual or statutory basis for an award of fees.
Cottonwood Mall, at 269-70
1-

1 1 le fees ha\ e been appo:.. i.^i .:.- .. -.ou.s:

Factual development and discovery scheduling
at

Basic factual

development

including witness interviews

deposition - *-CJ-. are sougi.. .
have

been necessary

regardless

.;\>

and

because it would

of the specific

claims

or

counterclaims asserted.
b)

Scheduling discov ei y

No reduction v as made because scheduling

would have been necessary regardless of the specific content of the
discovery.
A mount of fees in this categoi ] • : $12 1, :l 1 1 00
Reductions made: 0
Amount of fees sought: $124,414.00

7

2.

Preparation of answer and counterclaims
Most of this work would have been necessary regardless of the specific
claims or counterclaims. However, consistent with the Court's ruling at the
time of the original fee award, Richards has reduced the time spent on
these tasks by 30% to reflect work done on Richards' answer to the claim
concerning the sale of the second half of the Interwest Building and on
Richards' claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In addition Richards has
omitted

all time spent

doing legal research

on the fraud and

misrepresentation counterclaims.
Amount of fees in this category: $5,097.50
Reductions made: 51,762.80
Amount of fees sought: $3,334.70
3.

Plaintiffs' Discovery
a)

Plaintiffs

First

Set

of

Interrogatories

-

There

were

37

interrogatories, six of which concerned the Interwest Building and
the Executive Services Building. Richards therefore reduced the
time spent answering those interrogatories by 17%.
b)

Plaintiffs First Request for Production of Documents - There were
19 requests, three of which concerned the Option Agreement
8

(covering the second half of the Interwest building and the Executive
Services building, including rent on the Executive
bt lilciii ig).

R icl lards therefore

Services

redi iced the fees incurrec

responding to those requests by 17%.
c)

Plaintiffs

motion

Interrogatories

to compel

answers to tlle Firs

Set of

an :i I ; ii st R eqi lest foi Prodi iction - Ilie sa me

percentage (17%) was used in reducing time spent on defendants'
response to the motion to compel as was used with respect to
responding * : ; ' • vs First ^••' • • ;*-

:..ai*--v

m.; \ :~s- :T^viest

for Production because the motion was directed generallv to all
responses.
d)

P.ai:!!!:":""' Sec;*r\' ^ *'

'

;n

*-^'^:V'-

-V. K-. -

.is •>

n

- >:;v::^r

- There were 56 interrogatories and 21 requests for documents.
Seven of the interrogatories related to Richards' fraud counterclaim.
Richards theref'tin1 retinivil iln Mmr incurred in 'responding to
plaintiffs Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production
of Documents by 9%.
e)

•' Plaintiffs

Third Set of Interrogatories - Ail

interrogatories

concerned trial witnesses and exhibits and offers to purchase the
9

Interwest business. The information concerning offers to purchase
the Interwest business was sought, inter alia, to support Brown's
claim that the assets were worth what Richards contracted to pay for
them. A reduction of 30% of the time expended in responding to
these interrogatories has been made.
Plaintiffs Third Request for Production of Documents - All requests
sought documents concerning the operation and finances of the
Interwest business. Therefore, no reduction has been made.
Plaintiffs Motion for Order Compelling Discovery (February 1988)
- The motion generally addresses the Second Set of Interrogatories
and the Second and Third Requests for Production of Documents.
Therefore, Richards reduced the time incurred in connection with
this motion by the same percentage used with respect to the Second
Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production (9%).
Motion to compel answers to interrogatories and requests for
production

(June

1988)

-

The

motion

addresses

eleven

interrogatories and five requests for production, four of which
concerned Richards' fraud counterclaim and the Option Agreement.
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Richards has therefore reduced the time incurred in responding to
the motion to compel by 25%.
Amount of fees in this category: $23,772.00
Reductions made: $3,184.15
Amount of fees sought: $20,587.85
4.

Defendants' Discovery
a)

Defendant's First Request for Production - There were 14 requests,
one of which specifically addressed the Interwest building. Richards
therefore reduced time spent on the Request by 7%.

b)

Defendants'

First

Set of Interrogatories

- There

were

80

interrogatories, 49.5 of which related to Brown's claims regarding
the sale of the North Building and the Executive Services Building.
Therefore, Richards reduced the time spent in connection with
defendants' First Set of Interrogatories by 62%.
Amount of fees in this category: $1,582.00
Reductions made: $877.50
Amount of fees sought: $704.50
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5.

Plaintiffs Pretrial Motions
a)

Plaintiffs First Motion to Dismiss (June 1987) - Brown's motion
went to the whole counterclaim and therefore time was reduced by
30% on the same basis as set forth with respect to the preparation
of the answer and counterclaim.

b)

Plaintiffs motion to deposit rent into court - All time incurred in
response to this issue has been omitted.

c)

Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Richards" claim for rescission Richards sought rescission as an alternative contract remedy. Under
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals that a party need not receive
the full remedy sought to be considered the prevailing party entitled
to fees, all time spent in connection with this issue is compensable.

d)

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary judgment concerning the
Gulfstream Commander - Because the Gulfstream Commander was
a critical item of proof in Richards' successful defense of Brown's
contract claims concerning the sale of the business and on Richards'
breach of warranty counterclaim, all fees incurred in defeating this
motion are sought.
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e)

Plaintiffs Motion in Limine (concerning the testimony of John
Sharp and Joseph Malagrino) - Because this testimony went to the
value of the Interwest assets and Richards' breach of warranty claim,
all fees incurred in defeating this motion are sought.

f)

Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim - This motion addressed
Richards' entire counterclaim.

The motion made the same

arguments with respect to Richards' fraud and his breach of
warranty claims because those claims rest on the same factual
predicate - misrepresentations made by Brown in connection with
the sale of the Interwest business assets. Because Richards prevailed
on his breach of warranty claim and on his defense to Brown's
contract claims on the sale of the Interwest assets through proof of
those misrepresentations, and because of the common factual
predicate of the claims, the time has been reduced by 30% as was
work done on the answer and counterclaim.
g)

Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine concerning business losses - Richards
was permitted to offer evidence concerning the profitability of the
Interwest business in 1984 and 1985 and was permitted to offer
evidence concerning the value of the Interwest business. Therefore
13

no reduction has been made for time expended in opposing Brown's
motion.
Amount of fees in this category: $44,468.50
Reductions made: $9,579.95
Amount of fees sought: $34,888.55
6.

Damages
a)

Damage calculations - Richards is entitled to fees for work
performed in connection with his claims of breach of warranty and
in connection with his proof of the value of the Interwest assets, as
that issue was essential to Richards' success on his defense of lack
of substantial performance. Richards has reduced time incurred in
preparing initial damage calculations by 50%.!

b)

Supplementary answers to damage interrogatories - The same 50%
reduction was made with respect to work done on supplementary
answers as was made to earlier work on damage calculations.

l-

The time of Richards' accounting experts, Foote, Passey & Griffin Co., was
apportioned on the same basis as set forth above on all tasks in which they were
involved.
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c)

Pre-trial work on damages - Time spent prior to trial discussing and
preparing various damage calculations has been reduced by 50% on
the same basis as earlier damage calculations were.

Amount of fees in this category: $26,060.00
Reductions made: $13,779.00
Amount of fees sought: $12,281.00
7.

Defendants' Pretrial Motions
a)

Defendants' Motion to Amend - The motion was made to add to the
counterclaim the breach of fiduciary duty claim which had been
made in the original counterclaim and inadvertently omitted from the
amended counterclaim. This time has been omitted.

b)

Defendants' Motion In Limine (concerning Promissory Notes) - This
motion concerned four promissory notes, one of which was delivered
in connection with the sale of the second half of the Interwest
building and one of which was delivered in connection with the sale
of the South Building. Therefore time expended in connection with
this motion has been reduced by 50%.

c)

Motion to Quash Valley Bank Subpoena - Although Brown sought
the Valley Bank documents on a variety of issues, those documents
15

primarily went to the line of credit issue, which was raised in
Richards' breach of fiduciary claim, and rental payments on the
Interwest Building and the Executive Service Building. Therefore,
time expended in connection with this motion has been omitted
entirely.
Amount of fees in this category: $5,336.50
Reductions made: $3,381.50
Amount of fees sought: $1,955.00
8.

Jury Instructions and Special Interrogatories
a)

Preparation of special interrogatories to the jury - There were 12
basic interrogatories submitted in Richards' first proposed set of
special interrogatories, 8 of which concerned the purchase of the
second half of the Interwest Building, rent on the Interwest and the
Executive Services Buildings, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and
breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore time expended in drafting the
special interrogatories was reduced by 67%.

b)

Jury instructions - Richards initially submitted 38 proposed jury
instructions, 15 of which addressed the sale of the second half of the
Interwest Building, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of
16

fiduciary duty. Therefore time expended on preparing the proposed
jury instructions has been reduced by 40%.
Amount of fees in this category: SI7.504.50
Reductions made: $7,818.45
Amount of fees sought: $9,686.05
9.

General Trial Preparation and Trial
a)

Witness and exhibit list - 3 2 witnesses were listed by Richards.
Two were experts whose testimony went to the value of the
Interwest Building and that portion of Richards' damages for which
he is not seeking fees. Of the 265 documents listed on Richards'
exhibit list, 22 concern the purchase of the Interwest Building, the
Executive Services Building and the breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Richards therefore reduced the time expended in preparation of the
witness list by 6% and time expended in the preparation of the
exhibit list by 7%.

b)

Pretrial Order - A 30% reduction in time has been made based on
the Court's earlier reasoning.

c)

General trial preparation - A 30% reduction has been made.
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d)

Preparation for and testimony of Clayton Perkins - The testimony of
Mr. Perkins addressed all of Brown's claims under the contract.
Brown prevailed on his contract claim concerning the sale of the
second half of the Interwest Building but lost on the first and second
half of the Interwest assets. In addition, although Brown prevailed
on his claim for rent he did not prevail with respect to the amount
sought, the issue to which Mr. Perkins' testimony went. Therefore,
time expended in preparing to cross-examine and in cross-examining
Mr. Perkins has been reduced by 30%.

e)

Testimony of Jerry Webber and Dale Jackman - These individuals
testified concerning the value of the Interwest building. Therefore,
time expended in preparing and presenting the testimony of Dale
Jackman and in the cross-examination of Jerry Webber has been
omitted entirely.

f)

Witness preparation and examination - Other witness testimony was
predominately relevant to basic factual development and factual
proof of the claims upon which Richards prevailed or Richards'
defense to Brown's contract claim on the Interwest assets. Richards
has therefore reduced time expended in preparing to examine and
18

in examining Richards, Brown, Black, Jardine and Wittke by 30%
as their testimony went both to the Interwest building and the assets.
The other witnesses testified concerning the value and condition of
the assets and no reduction has been made.
Amount of fees in this category: $286,031.50
Reductions made: $65,255.15
Amount of fees sought: $220,776.35
10.

Preparation of Judgment and Related Issues
Preparation and argument on proposed judgments - There were no disputes
concerning the form of judgment on the Interwest Building or Executive
Building. The disputes concerned treatment of Richards' jury verdict on
the Interwest assets and Brown's contract claim on the Interwest assets and
the breach of warranty award.

Richards ultimately prevailed on both

issues, which were governed by the Asset Sale Agreement.
incurred is therefore sought.
Amount of fees in this category: $59,099.50
Reductions made: 0
Amount of fees sought: $59,099.50
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All time

11.

Post-judgment Motions
Richards' Motion was addressed exclusively to issues on which he
prevailed and is entitled to fees, e ^ proper treatment of the jury's finding
of no substantial performance by Brown on the Asset Purchase Agreement
and of the jury's $100,000 award on breach of warranty. Therefore fees for
all time expended is sought. Brown's postjudgment motion was directed
exclusively to issues for which fees are not available, e.g. Richards' fraud
and breach of fiduciary duty verdicts. All time spent in opposing that
motion has therefore been eliminated.

Amount of fees in this category: $20,458.00
Reductions made: $11,390.50
Amount of fees sought: $9,067.50
12,

Petition for Writ of Mandamus
This time has been eliminated entirely based on the Court's reasoning at
the time of the initial fee award.
Amount of fees in this category: $13,978.50
Reductions made: $13,978.50
Amount of fees sought: 0
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13.

Negotiation concerning possible sale of Interwest and other non litigation
services
This time has been eliminated.

Amount of fees in this category: 57,948.00
Reductions made: $7,948.00
Amount of fees sought: 0
14.

Attorneys Fees
Time spent preparing an attorneys fee application is compensable. Donnes
v. Orlando, 221 Mont. 256, 720 P.2d 233 (1986); Serrano v. Unruh, 652
P.2d 985 (Cal. 1982). No reduction in the time expended has been made.

Amount of fees in this category: $26,143.00
Reductions made: 0
Amount of fees sought: $26,143.00
Costs have been apportioned as follows:
1.

Long Distance Telephone Calls - Richards seeks reimbursement for all of
these amounts.
Amount of costs in this category: $445.00
Reductions made: 0
Amount of costs sought: $445.00
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2.

Filing Fees - Richards seeks reimbursement for all of these amounts.
Amount of costs in this category: $235.00
Reductions made: 0
Amount of costs sought: $235.00

3.

Witness Fees - Richards seeks reimbursement for all of these amounts,
including amounts charged for service of subpoenas, as the witnesses
appearing by subpoena primarily testified in connection with compensable
issues.
Amount of fees in this category: $955.40
Reductions made: 0
Amount of fees sought: $955.40

4.

Photocopies - Richards has reduced photocopy costs incurred through
December 1988 by 30%. A review of the bills indicates that at no time did
the noncompensable portion of attorney time which generated significant
copy charges rise above this amount. From January through April 1989,
copying costs were reduced by 7%, the figure used with respect to
apportioning time on the exhibit list, because copies in that period were
primarily generated by preparation and distribution of trial exhibits.
Copying charges were eliminated on the bill dated September 25, 1989
because most copies were made in connection with the petition for writ of
22

mandamus. Copying charges were reduced by 50% on the bill dated March
15, 1990 to eliminate charges in connection with opposing Brown's
postjudgment motions.
separately.

In

On some bills photocopy costs are broken out

other

cases, the

photocopy

"miscellaneous" or "other" costs category.

costs

comprise

the

In that instance, counsel

attempted to separate out noncompensable, noncopying costs and then
reduced the remainder by the appropriate percentage.
Amount of costs in this category: $3,990.81
Reductions made: $410.54
Amount of costs sought: $3,580.27
5.

Miscellaneous costs - As noted above, the appropriate percentage was
deducted

from

copying

costs

contained

in

this

category

and

noncompensable costs were deducted. Other miscellaneous costs, reduced
if appropriate by the amounts shown on the individual invoices, were
included in this category.
Amount of costs in this category: $11,763.83
Reductions made: $1,116.32
Amount of costs sought: $10,647.51
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6.

SOS Temporary Services - The same deduction used with respect to
photocopy charges has been applied here because the temporary services
were used in connection with copying jobs.
Amount of costs in this category: $11.11
Reductions made: $3.32
Amount of costs sought: $7.79

The invoices submitted have been highlighted in yellow to show time entries
which were eliminated entirely because time was spent on noncompensable work (e.g.
a claim for which there is no right to recover attorneys fees or on which Richards lost)
and in blue to show time entries which have been reduced because some portion of the
time spent was on noncompensable work.

In addition time entries for which

compensation is being sought on Richards' Application for Attorneys Fees and Costs
Incurred on Appeal have been highlighted in pink and are not included in this fee
application. The percentage reduction and time subtracted in tenths of hours is noted
next to the original time entry. A summary sheet attached to each bill shows the fees
and costs billed, fees and costs reduced or omitted, and the total fees and costs sought.
The following summarizes fees and costs incurred and sought by Richards from
the beginning of the case through his first fee application in April 1990 and from April
1990 through October 30, 1993:
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March 1987 to March 30, 1990
Fees Incurred
$618,447.50

Fees Requested
$479,986.00

Costs Incurred
$69,681.70

Costs Requested
$51,505.01

Total Incurred
$688,129.20

Total Requested
$531,491.01

April 1990 to October 31, 1993
Fees Incurred
$43,446.00

Fees Requested
$42,777.00

Costs Incurred
$3,665.10

Costs Requested
$3,662.07

Total Incurred
$47,111.10

Total Requested
$46,439.07

Based upon the reductions for noncompensable time shown on the invoices
submitted, Richards is entitled to an award of fees and costs for work billed through
March 1990 in the amount of $531,491.01 plus interest and an award of fees and costs
for work billed from April 1990 to October 30, 1993 in the amount of $46,439.07.
C.

The Fee Award Sought By Richards Is Supported by The Factors
Which the Court Is Directed to Consider

Cottonwood Mall directs courts to consider six specific factors in determining an
appropriate fee award:
1.

the difficulty of the litigation;
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2.

the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case;

3.

the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case;

4.

the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services;

5.

the amount involved in the case and the result attained; and

6.

the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved.

830 P.2d at 269.
The first and third factors listed - the difficulty of the litigation and the
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case - are related. As the Court is
aware, this was an extremely complex case, requiring an eight week jury trial during
which 34 witnesses were called (a number of them three or more times), expert witness
testimony on a number of sophisticated appraisal and valuation issues was offered,
approximately 450 exhibits were introduced and a number of difficult legal issues were
briefed and argued. The amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000. The number of
hours expended reflect all of these factors.2

2

As further evidence of the reasonableness of the number of hours expended by
Richards' counsel, Richards notes that counsel for Brown expended 5,144.68 hours
during the course of this litigation. Plaintiffs Trial Brief Related to the Issues of
Interest, Attorney's Fee and Costs dated April 5, 1990 at 31-32. Richards' counsel
expended only 4,364 hours for litigation activities. If paralegal hours are added, the total
for Richards is 4,819.
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The next factor - the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case - is
demonstrated by the staffing of the case. Throughout the pretrial proceedings two
attorneys handled the case. On almost no occasions did both attorneys attend depositions
or other discovery proceedings. Similarly, following the end of the discovery phase, the
same three attorneys handled the case through trial preparation, trial and post trial
proceedings.3 The addition of a third attorney for trial preparation and trial permitted
much of the legal research and writing and document analysis to be done at a
significantly lower hourly rate than if either of the more senior attorneys had done it.
Paralegal assistance was used whenever possible to control cost.
The fourth and sixth factors to be considered - the fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar services and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved are also related because to a great extent the hourly rates charged are a reflection of the
experience and expertise of the attorneys involved.

The hourly rates charged for this

litigation are the regular hourly rates for the attorneys involved and the same rates
charged for work on other complex, commercial litigation, as set forth in the Affidavits
of Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Elizabeth T. Dunning. The hourly rates are reasonable

3

Elizabeth T. Dunning was assigned to the case in place of Frank N. Smith, the
attorney who handled pretrial proceedings, after Mr. Smith left Watkiss & Campbell to
accept an inhouse counsel position in Nevada.
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for attorneys with the levels of experience and expertise of Richards' attorneys, as
detailed in their Affidavits.
The final factor - the amount involved in the case and the result attained - also
support the fee award requested by Richards. As noted above, the amount at stake based
upon Brown's claimed damages was over $5,000,000.

Richards was successful in

defeating all but $1,000,000 of those claims and obtaining a recovery of $950,000 on his
own claims, plus entitlement to the award of attorneys fees at issue.
For the reasons set forth above Richards' application for fees provides the
necessary basis for an award of fees and costs in the amount of $577,930.08 plus
appropriate interest, pursuant to the standards of Cottonwood Mall.
D.

Richards Is Entitled to Postjudgment
October 18, 1990 on the Award of Fees

Interest from

The Court should also award Richards postjudgment interest at 10 percent on its
fee award for work done through March 30, 1990 from October 18, 1990 to the present
because the Court found Richards to be the prevailing party on the Asset Purchase
Agreement and therefore

entitled to a fee award at the time it entered its

Judgment on October 18, 1990.

Final

The Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's decision

that Richards was the prevailing party, entitled to a fee award, but vacated the amount
of the award because of the absence of sufficient factual findings to support of the
award. Richards is therefore entitled to postjudgment interest on those fees incurred up
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to the time of his original fee application from the time that the original judgment in his
favor awarding him fees was entered.
In Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp., 754 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1988), the
court addressed the computation of interest on an award entered following an appeal. In
Mason, plaintiff lost in the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and
remanded for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff. On remand, the trial court entered
judgment in plaintiffs favor and awarded interest from the date of the original judgment
in defendant's favor.

Defendant then appealed, arguing interest should have been

awarded only from the date of the new judgment. On appeal, the court reversed again,
holding that when a judgment is reversed, and entry of judgment for another party
ordered, interest should run only from date of the new judgment.

However, in its

opinion, the Court of Appeals distinguished the situation where a party retains its
judgment or right to judgment, but the amount is modified upward or downward:
A judgment bears legal interest from the date of its entry in the trial court
even though it is still subject to direct attack. When a judgment is
modified upon appeal, whether upward or downward, the new sum draws
interest from the date of entry of the original order, not from the date of the
new judgment.
Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp.. 754 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting
Stockton Theatres. Inc. v. Palermo, 55 Cal.2d 439, 360 P.2d 76, 11 Cal.Rptr. 580
(1961)); see also, Hewitt v. General Tire and Rubber Co.. 5 Utah 2d 379, 302 P.2d 712
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(1956) (party who obtains reinstatement of verdict and judgment in its favor on appeal
is entitled to interest from date of original award).
Richards is therefore entitled to postjudgment interest on the requested award of
$531,491.01 for work billed through March 30, 1990 in the amount of $179,978.87 as
shown on Exhibit C attached.
E.

Richards Is Entitled to An Additional Award of Fees For Work Done
After the Fee Application of April 5, 1990

In addition to the fees for work performed through the date of Richards' fee
application (April 5, 1990), the Court should award Richards fees incurred in
compensable activities after the date of the previous Application. Those compensable
activities include: 1) finalizing the fee application and supporting bills, responding to
Brown's fee application and argument on Richards' Application for Fees in April and
May 1990, 2) preparation of the final judgment at the request of the Court and continuing
negotiation and litigation concerning the form of the final judgment, including litigation
initiated by Brown concerning supplementing the judgment in January and February
1991, and 3) preparation of Richards' Motion to Enter Amended Judgment and of this
Memorandum in Support of that Motion.
Invoices which show the time incurred from April 1990 through November 1993
are submitted with counsel's affidavits. The invoices provide the detailed evidentiary
basis required for an award of fees.
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No reduction in the fees incurred since April 5, 19904 has been made for work
done in connection with Richards' fee application because this Court agreed with
Richards' contention in his initial Fee Application that Richards was the prevailing party
on the Asset Sale Agreement and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. Time
spent preparing and arguing a fee application is compensable. Fees are sought for time
spent opposing Brown's request for attorneys fees because Brown argued that he was the
sole prevailing party and Richards was not entitled to any fee award.

Richards'

opposition to Brown's fee request therefore vindicated a right promised to Richards in
the Asset Sale Agreement.
No reduction in time spent in preparing, negotiating and litigating the Final
Judgment has been made. This Court requested counsel for Richards to prepare the final
judgment incorporating the Court's rulings on prejudgment interest and attorneys fees.
This time should therefore be fully, rather than partially, compensable.

4

The invoices submitted with Richards' initial fee application reflected most time and
costs incurred through March 31, 1990, although a few March time entries were not
billed until the April Campbell Maack & Sessions bill and one January entry was not
billed until the November Watkiss & Saperstein bill. The invoices for work done in the
first few days of April before the original Fee Application was actually submitted to the
Court were not available at the time the original Fee Application was submitted. That
time is included here.
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No reduction has been made for time spent in litigating Brown's efforts to
supplement the judgment in January 1991 because Richards defeated that motion and the
time was necessarily spent to respond to Brown's motion.
The total time spent in the categories described above on pages 8-22 from March
30, 1990 through November 30, 1990 was:
Preparing for and arguing fee application
and preparing this request for fees (Category 14)

231.7 hours

Preparing final judgment, litigating
motion to supplement judgment and preparing
motion to amend judgment (Category 10)

156.6 hours

The amount of time spent on each activity was reasonable given the complexity
of the litigation, as discussed above. The rates charged Richards continue to be the rates
regularly charged by the attorneys for complex commercial litigation and are reasonable
for their experience and expertise.
Richards is therefore entitled to an award of fees and costs in the amount of
$46,439.07 for work billed from April 1990 through October 30, 1993.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above Richards requests that the Court enter an Amended
Final Judgment making the following changes and additions:
1. Amend Section I, paragraph 1 on Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action to enter
judgment for Richards and against Brown;
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2. Amend Section I, paragraph 2 on Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action to enter
judgment for Richards and against Brown;
3. Amend Section 1, paragraph 3 on Plaintiffs' Sixth Cause of Action to enter
judgment for Richards and against Brown;
4. Amend Section III, paragraph 1 on Richards' First Counterclaim to reflect the
purchase price of $900,000, the jury's award of $500,000, and the payments, interest
accruals and balance due set forth on Exhibit 1;
5. Amend Section III, paragraph 4 on Richards' Third Counterclaim to enter
judgment for Richards in the amount of $100,000, plus $56,630.14 in prejudgment
interest and $65,987.67 in postjudgment interest;
6. Amend Section IV, paragraph 16 on Attorneys Fees and Costs to award
Richards $531,491.01 for fees and costs incurred prior to April 5, 1990, plus $179,978.87
in postjudgment interest and to award Richards $46,439.07 for fees incurred in the
district court after April 5, 1990, plus any fees incurred from the submission of this
Memorandum until the entry of judgment.
DATED this

[ ^ d a y of April, 1994.

Robert S. Campbell, Jr. H
( \ 63^3
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, 13th Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Elizab^uKT. Dunning
Carolyn Cox
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS
Broadway Centre, Suite 800
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304
Attorneys for Defendants
and Counter Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS, Broadway Centre, Suite 800, 111 East Broadway,
Salt Lake City, Utah, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5 Utah Rules Civil
Procedure, a true copy of the attached MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT (CORRECTED) were hand delivered to the
following-named individual:
Bruce E. Coke, Esq.
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
on this jSh

day of April, 1994.

(AfAlJf' OfAiJ
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Exhibit A

BROWN V. RICHARDS
COMPUTATION OF BALANCE DUE ON
SECOND HALF OF BUSINESS ASSETS
FROM

TO

01-Feb-85
25-Oct-85

25-Oct-85
Ol-Apr-86

DAYS

PAYMENT

266
158

$30,534.65
23,159,25

424

$53,693.90

PRINCIPAL BALANCE
PRE JUDGEMENT INTEREST AT 10%
Ol-Apr-86 20-Dec-89 1359 DAYS
INTEREST ON LATE QUARTERLY
PAYMENTS THROUGH DECEMBER 20, 1989

INTEREST

$14,575.34
7,966.69

$15,959.31
15,192.56

$22,542.04

$31,151.86

$168,848.14

62,867.02
11,301.64
243,016.79

POST JUDGEMENT INTEREST AT 10%
20-Dec-89 07-Mar-94 1538 DAYS
DAILY INTEREST $66.58

PRINCIPAL

102,399.95

$345,416.75

BALANCE
$200,000.00
184,040.69
168,848.14

BROWN V. RICHARDS
COMPUTATION OF BALANCE DUE ON
FIRST HALF OF BUSINESS ASSETS
FROM

23-Apr-84
Ol-May-84
06-Jul-84
10-Oct-84
15-Jan-85
24-Apr-85
15-Jul-85
31-Jul-85
25-Oct-85

TO

Ol-May-84
06-Jul-84
10-Oct-84
15-Jan-85
24-Apr-85
15-Jul-85
31-Jul-85
25-Oct-85
02-Apr-86

DAYS

PAYMENT

INTEREST

PRINCIPAL

$18,000..00
34,200,.00
10,125,.00
10,125..00
10,125..00
10,125,.00
45,000,.00
9,000,.00
18,225..00

$0.00
3,290.96
3,973.90
3,851.83
3,761.10
2,972.28
548.60
1,901.39
3,206.14

$18,000.00
30,909.04
6,151.10
6,273.17
6,363.90
7,152.72
44,451.40
7,098.61
15,018.86

709 $164,925,00

$23,506.20

$141,418.80

8
66
96
97
99
82
16
86
159

PRINCIPAL BALANCE
PRE JUDGEMENT INTEREST AT 10%
02-Apr-86 Ol-Jul-90 1551 DAYS
INTEREST ON LATE QUARTERLY PAYMENTS
THROUGH JULY 1, 1990

$58,581.20

24,893.00

5,073.62
88,547.82

POST JUDGEMENT INTEREST AT 10%
Ol-Jul-90 07-Mar-94 1345 DAYS
DAILY INTEREST $24.26

32,629.26

$121,177.08

BALANCE
$200,000.00
182,000.00
151,090.96
144,939.86
138,666.68
132,302.78
125,150.06
80,698.67
73,600.06
58,581.20

Exhibit B

BROWN V. RICHARDS
COMPUTATION OF INTEREST ON
BREACH OF WARRANTY CLAIM
JUDGEMENT
PRE JUDGEMENT INTEREST AT 10%
24-Apr-84 20-Dec-89 2066 DAYS

$100,000.00

56,602.74
156,602.74

POST JUDGEMENT INTEREST AT 10%
20-Dec-89 07-Mar-94 1538 DAYS
DAILY INTEREST $42.90

65,987.67

$222,590.41

Exhibit C

BROWN V. RICHARDS
COMPUTATION OF INTEREST ON
RICHARD'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

FEES AND COSTS
POST JUDGEMENT INTEREST AT 10%
ia-Oct-90 07-Mar-94 1236 DAYS
DAILY INTEREST $145.61

§531,491.01

179,978.87

$711,469.88

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 21, I hereby
certify that two copies of the attached REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
AND

RESPONSE

BRIEF

OF

CROSS-APPELLEES

were

served

upon

the

following:

Bruce E. Coke, Esq.
John W. Call, Esq.
NYGAARD COKE & VINCENT
3 33 North 3 00 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
by depositing a properly addressed envelope containing the same in
the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, on this^p^_

C:\MyFiles\Richards\CertificateofService.wpd

da

Y

of

October, 1998.

